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Abstract 
This study is an attempt to identify whether the power to submit amendments in the European 
Parliament is subject to a form of politically corruptive ‘capture’. Using a regression analysis and a 
dataset containing over 80000 amendments from over 600 MEP’s, this thesis tests whether or not 
higher levels of perceived political corruption in European member states influence the relative 
amount of amendments per state. Contrary to the theoretical arguments, results suggest that lower 
levels of perceived corruption have a positive effect on the relative amount of amendments per state. 
Due to multicollinearity of the data on perceived political corruption and levels of democratization, 
this effect suggest that the data on perceived political corruption is a function of the levels of 
democratization. 
 
Introduction 
While literature on the causes of (political) corruption such as found in Mauro (1998) and Rose 
Ackerman (1997) is extensive, literature on political corruption within specific European institutions is 
not. Covering fraud, nepotism and cronyism in the European Commission, Shore (2005) is an 
exception to the fact that most works focus exclusively on specific areas where parts of the European 
framework can foster corruption in its member states, such as regulatory harmonization, 
decentralization and market liberalization (Warner, 2007).   
 
The aim of this research is to provide an analysis of the extent to which the legislative behavior of 
submitting amendments (by MEP’s) in the European Parliament is subject to political corruption. The 
research question is thus formulated as: ‘What is the impact of national levels of corruption on the 
relative amount of amendments per nationality in the European Parliament?’ 
 
The European Parliament functions as a most-likely case to analyse patterns of political corruption. 
The arguments for why patterns of political corruption will be most prominently present in the 
European Parliament are firstly derived from political-economic theory, of which the works of Mauro 
(1998) and Rose-Ackerman (1997) are the most important. Secondly, arguments specifying the 
relationship between interest groups and the European Institutions are used - such as can be found in 
the work by Bouwen (2002). Thirdly, a theoretical discussion follows about the causes of political 
corruption and the different forms of legislative behavior. 
 
Regarding the effects on the political process, the question of whether or not the legislative behavior 
of MEP’s is subject to political corruption would seem to be of great concern not only because of its 
societal effects, but also on an academic level. For scholars interested in political processes in 
contemporary democratic systems, the relationship between political corruption and legislative 
behavior is of importance since it affects democratic political processes in numerous ways. Generally, 
political corruption reduces the effective domain of public action, and thus the reach of democracy, by 
transforming public agencies of collective action to instruments of private benefit. (Warren, 2004, p. 
328). More specifically in terms of legislative functions, policymaking can only be a public process 
when citizens have the confidence that the motivational force behind a decision are the arguments 
which are made and displayed. When a representatives’ decision is the result of whispered voices who 
have bought access, the arguments made and displayed are not those motivating the decisions, 
eroding the relationship between political deliberation and actual decisions (Warren, 2004, p. 338).  
Furthermore, for scholars interested in the (de)-legitimacy of political systems and institution, the 
relationship between political corruption and legislative behavior is of interest as well. As Della Porta 
and Vannucci put it: “By attacking two of the fundamental principles on which democracy is based, the 
equality of citizens before institutions and the open nature of decision making, corruption contributes 
to the delegitimation of political and institutional systems in which it takes root.” (Della Porta and 
Vannucci, p. 537). 
 
Concepts and theory 
Like many concepts in the social sciences, what exactly counts as ‘political corruption’ is not a simple 
matter of fact. The popular, negatively connoted, understanding of political corruption is often 
imprecise and may attribute the concept to other mismatches in the arena of political and economic 
systems which are not in a clear sense corrupt (Philp, 2015, p.19).  
 
Before an attempt to conceptualise political corruption is made, the concept requires a more general 
comment on political systems as a whole, simply because ‘corruption’ implies there exists a certain 
state of affairs wherein politics is not corrupt. In the words of Philp (2015), political scientists are 
‘concerned with identifying the conditions for the emergence and continuation of a stable, legitimate 
political order’ (Philp, 2015, p.21). In this view, a political system is understood as a structure which 
allocates and exchanges (public) goods as a function – a function that can be undermined by failing to 
conform to the norms and expectations of that structure (Philp, 2015, p. 22). In other words, ‘normal’ 
politics has a structural function that can be undermined by individuals. As a result of this subversion, 
they gain an advantage for themselves or their groups or fractions at the expense of the intended 
beneficiary of that office - such as the general public.  
 
This paper adopts the concept of political corruption in a more ‘narrow’ definition, namely the misuse 
of public office for the gain of the individual, or for the gain of a particular group or faction. An 
example given by Heywood illustrating this definition is “... when politicians or functionaries use their 
privileged access to resources (in whatever form) illegitimately to benefit themselves or 
others.”(Heywood, 1997, p. 421).  The aforementioned ‘structural function’ argument here is useful 
for two reasons. Firstly, this and other definitions also capture behavior that is not generally seen as 
political corruption – such as for example ‘President Clinton’s philandering ..’ (Philp, 2015, p.23). By 
looking at political corruption in a way that highlights the structural function which corruption 
supposedly undermines, it is possible to differentiate more between political and non-political 
behavior. Secondly, political corruption includes various forms of behavior within the political system 
such as bribery, clientelism, patronage, nepotism and cronyism: The structural function argument 
highlights the fact that while these types of behavior are distinct from each other, they share the fact 
that all types undermine the aforementioned function by trying to achieve a type of gain for 
themselves or their groups or factions. 
 
The economic rationale for corruptive behavior 
Whether or not corruption occurs is based on the incentives facing an individual, and the associated 
costs and benefits of resorting to corruptive behavior (Warner, 2015, p. 123). In other words: “a risk-
neutral briber or public official compares the expected costs with the expected benefit, and is corrupt 
only if the balance is positive.” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 40). Rose Ackerman argues that it is possible 
to roughly distinguish two kinds of corrupt market structures. The first encompasses corruption which 
is competitive, so that in general the same ‘bribe price’ is charged for the same services such as a 
telephone line or a passport (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 39). However, when this kind of 
competitiveness is not present as is the case in high-level corruption, individuals can more freely 
create economic rents and control their distribution (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 39). Government 
intervention, or the absence of it, can establish these economic rents (Mauro, 1998, p. 11). For 
example, since the extraction of natural resources such as oil creates vast profits, officials which deal 
with the allocation rights may expect to be offered bribes (Mauro, 1998, p. 11). Similarly, firms may 
seek to push favoritist policies such as subsidies and tax deductions in order to create these rents. 
(Mauro, 1998, p. 11). Additionally, since corruption is illegal, the effective benefit which arises from 
corruptive behavior depends on the risk of detection and the degree of punishment (Rose-Ackerman, 
1997, p. 40). This illegality creates additional costs of keeping the corrupt transaction a secret which 
are worthwhile only for ‘very large, one-of-a-kind deals’ (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 41). 
 
The ‘field’ wherein MEP’s operate presents a type of high-level market structure where there exists 
little competitiveness, allowing MEP’s can more freely create economic rents (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, 
p. 41). The fact that MEP’s are in a position to influence European policy which has far-reaching effects 
possibly constitutes gains large enough to compensate for the additional costs of covering up such 
transactions. Another factor which possibly has an effect on the comparison between costs and 
benefits, is the fact that unlike other officials, MEP’s may find themselves in a position that they have 
to rely on financial resources needed for a re-election campaign (Dür, 2008, p. 1216). 
 
Yet, while political corruption is a possible result of the interplay between officials and interest groups 
which seek to influence European policy, lobbying is another. A possible counterargument, arguing 
against the case that the influence of MEP’s may be subject to patterns of political corruption is found 
in the works of Harstad & Svensson (2011) and Campos & Giovannoni (2007). The work by Harstad & 
Svensson (2011) suggests that firms tend to resort to political corruption in a situation where 
economic development is lower, whereas there is a shift towards the practice of lobbying where 
economic development is higher. The research by Campos & Giovannoni (2007), although based on 
data of transition economies, suggests that lobbying is a more effective instrument for exerting 
political influence than bribing, and that the practice of lobbying may develop as a substitute for 
political corruption throughout the process of economic development (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007, 
p.20).  
 
 
Political corruption and the European institutions 
Although the research by Bouwer (2002) covers lobbying, he argues that the degree to which an 
institution of the EU will respond to the demands of private interests depends which private actors 
can  “provide the highest quantity and quality of the critical access good in the most efficient way” 
(Bouwer, 2002, p. 382). Covering individual large firms, European associations, and national 
associations, Bouwer ranked these organizations by the highest degree of access. Consequently, 
Brouwer argues that in the field of lobbying, large individual firms have the lowest degree of access in 
comparison with the European Commission and the Council of Ministers (Bouwer, 2002, p. 383).   
A strong argument can be made that within this multi-level system, large individual firms are inclined 
to primarily attempt to influence European policy via the institution wherein they enjoy the highest 
degree of access, which in case of these firms, is the European Commission (Bouwer, 2002, p. 383).  
For large firms, the European Commission provides a chance to influence policy proposals at an early 
stage through for example ‘Consultative Committees’ which provide an access point for interest 
groups to influence policy via expertise and broad interest input (Mahony, 2004, p. 448).   
When proposals are examined at the European Parliament stage however, the fact that large 
individual firms enjoy the lowest degree of ‘legal’ access at the European Parliament in the form of 
lobbying access (Bouwer, 2002, p. 383) possibly creates incentives to employ illegal means of 
influence, resulting in political corruption.  
 
What kind of legislative behavior should be studied? 
Legislative acts wherein individual MEP’s have the opportunity to more freely create economic rents, 
are instances wherein political corruption is most likely found (Mauro, 1998). The degree to which an 
opportunity to more freely create rents arises, is partly dependent on the degree to which there are 
checks and balances on the legislative behavior of individual MEP’s. Both in plenary sessions and the 
parliamentary committees, legislative behavior is bound by a series of measures of control, limiting 
the individual influence MEP’s can have on the policy process. Such measures of control are present 
within national, as well as European political parties. By applying the framework of the principal-agent 
theory, Mühlböck (2012) states that national parties which act as a ‘principal’ have several potential 
control mechanisms to ensure that MEP’s act according to their will. Although writing about the 
controlling mechanisms which influence voting behavior, these mechanisms conversely have an effect 
on both behavior in plenary, as behavior in parliamentary committees.  
For example, national parties can strive to keep a close hand on the selection of candidates for the 
European Parliament because access or refusal can be seen as ‘carrots and sticks’ to help keep MEP’s 
in line (Mühlböck, 2012, p. 610). Similarly, national parties may issue the MEP with prior instructions, 
or require mandatory reporting as a monitoring mechanism (Mühlböck, 2012, p. 610). European 
parties may similarly employ the measure of promotion and degradation to ensure MEP’s vote in 
accordance with the party line: Hix (2002) argues that the fact that European parties control who wins 
key offices or committee chairs acts as a measure of discipline, keeping members to defect from the 
‘party line’ (Hix, 2002, p. 690). 
 
While it is possible that these measures of control discipline MEP’s both in plenary and in 
parliamentary committees, there arguably exists more individual agency of MEP’s in parliamentary 
commitees. Whereas Hix argues that the control of committee positions might act as a measure of 
discipline, Whitaker states that most MEP’s are free to self-select their own committee positions 
based on their own policy preferences (Whitaker, 2001, p. 82). When looking at what influence parties 
have within the committees, Whitaker notes that within committees, European parties coordinate 
group leaders to act as a controlling agent (Whitaker, 2001, p. 84). The results by Whitaker indicate 
that while some MEP’s argue that these group leaders can largely determine the outcome of 
committee meetings, some respondents refer to the weakness or incompetence of both group leaders 
and some committee chairs (Whitaker, 2001, p. 84).  
 
Furthermore, while it is true that finalized committee reports can still be altered in plenary sessions, 
Farrell & Heritiére state that typically plenary sessions follow the substantive position of the 
committee in question (Farrell & Heritiére, 2004, p. 1196). ‘Accordingly, the amendment can be 
described as the most valuable tool at the disposal of any individual committee member’ (Hurka, 
2013, p.274). 
In terms of political economic causes of political corruption, MEP’s are arguably more free to create 
economic rents within parliamentary committees, than in plenary sessions. Considering the fact that 
plenary typically follows the position of the committee, submitting an amendment within a 
parliamentary committee is a more fruitful endeavour for influencing European policy at the individual 
level than casting a vote in plenary. Consequently, the power to submit amendments provides the 
most likely form of legislative behavior which interest groups will try to capture, in order to influence 
policy.   
 
However, although the legislative power of submitting amendments is a possible instrument of 
influence and therefore can facilitate an illegal exchange between MEP’s and interest groups, whether 
or not an amendment is submitted is dependent of many other variables. For instance, the amount of 
years of experience MEP’s have, their specific expertise on subjects, the amount of assistants hired, 
and ideological orientation all have a possible effect on amount of amendments which are submitted. 
For example, while the works of Hurka on the ENVI-commission show that the left-right dimension 
does not seem to play a decisive role in whether an amendment is successful (Hurka, 2013, p.292), the 
act of submitting and withdrawing an amendment can still serve as a solely political statement which 
may be influenced by ideological orientation.  
 
 
Theory and hypothesis  
This thesis thus assumes that political corruption is most likely found in the amendment-behavior of 
MEP’s for several reasons. Firstly, political economic theory argues that corruption is the result of a 
comparison between expected benefits and expected costs between two actors (Rose-Ackerman, 
1997, p. 40). Because the position of MEP’s within the European Parliament forms a high-level market 
structures with little competitiveness, MEP’s can create economic rents more freely than other 
officials can (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 41). 
Additionally, unlike other officials, MEP’s have a need for financial resources to finance re-election 
campaigns (Dür, 2008, p. 1216), possibly providing an additional incentive for an exchange between 
MEP’s and interest groups. The fact that MEP’s have an opportunity to influence policy which can 
either can create or diminish economic rents (Mauro, 1998, p. 11), makes them likely to being offered 
a bribe. Secondly, although different actors have various degrees of access to the European 
Institutions (Bouwer, 2002, p. 383), the fact that large firms have limited access to the European 
Parliament may be an incentive to seek illegal means of influence within that stage of the European 
policy process. Thirdly, measures of control limit the individual agency of MEP’s and therefore limit the 
degree to which MEP’s are free to create economic rents. Since different measures of control arguably 
are less limiting within the parliamentary commissions than in plenary sessions, parliamentary 
commissions allow MEP’s to more freely create economic rents which help create corrupt exchanges. 
Combined with the fact that plenary sessions usually follow the substantive position of the committee 
in question (Farrell & Heritiére, 2004, p. 1196), the power to submit amendments is the most useful 
instrument of influence for interest groups and therefore the most likely form of legislative behavior 
where political corruption will manifest.  
 
Based on the theory as discussed above, it is possible to form a hypothesis. The hypothesis will be 
formulated as: ‘The higher the level of perceived political corruption of a country, the higher the 
relative amount of amendments of the MEP’s from this nationality will be.’ 
 
 
Case selection 
Because of the aforementioned theoretical discussion on the probability of political corruption, the 
European Parliament provides an adequate case to analyse the relationship between national levels of 
political corruption and country-specific parliamentary behavior of MEP’s, since it is the most likely 
case wherein patterns of corruption can be found. Although the European Parliament is theoretically 
not the only case wherein multi-national parliamentarians can be analysed by a similar output, due to 
reasons of data transparency and availability an analysis of the European Parliament is the most 
feasible. Furthermore, due to a lack of availability of amendment data in other International 
Parliamentary Assemblies (IPA’s), the European Parliament is the only IPA wherein an analysis on the 
variation in the independent variable (amendments) on a supra-national level is possible.  
 
 
Research design, operationalization & methods of data collection 
This research is of exploratory nature, wherein the hypothesis is tested in a quantative way. This is 
done by using a regression-analysis to determine the relationship between national levels of political 
corruption and the amount of amendments per nationality. For the most contemporary results, the 
year 2015 is used. Since this is the 8th parliamentary term, the N consists of 28 member-states. While 
the data of the Corruption Perception Index was readily available for 2015, a database of amendments 
on the year 2015 was not. Although VoteWatch does present data about the amount of amendments 
MEP’s submit, inconsistencies arose when trying to verify this data. Therefore, a database was made 
encompassing the amendment data of the entire year 2015. More specifically, the database is 
composed of all the amendments to draft reports of all parliamentary committees in the year 2015 by 
analysing the individual documents, amounting to 80000+ amendments from 600+ MEP’s.  
 
Operationalization of amendments. 
The independent variable ‘amendments per nationality’ is constructed by analysing all the 
amendments per specific MEP and hereafter categorizing all specific MEP’s and their amendments per 
nationality so that a total sum of amendments per nationality is made. This data includes amendments 
with limited political impact because it includes “amendments whose political impact is usually 
negligible” such as “technical specifications, definitions and clarifications” (Hurka, 2013, p. 281). This is 
done, since judging a priori whether or not the substance of an amendment was created out of 
corrupt practice is equally impossible as it is arbitrary. Since the relative differences between 
nationalities is of interest, hereafter the total sum of amendments per nationality is divided by the 
total sum of MEP’s to create the relative variable ‘amendments per nationality’.  
 
As aforementioned, although it is theoretically assumed that variation in amendment efficiency is 
partly due to the existence of patterns of political corruption, it is possible that other variables such as 
experience, expertise, and staffing create a systemic bias within the amendment data, posing an 
inherent danger to the validity of the variable. Similarly, on numerous occasions, there exist 
amendments with more than one author. This amendment is counted as such for all the authors, 
which may result in an overrepresentation in cases where MEP’s regularly jointly submit amendments.  
 
 
Operationalization of political corruption. 
The dependent variable, political corruption, is measured on the basis of Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI is a composite index of perception-based measures of 
governance, such as surveys of households and firms, as well as expert assessments (Kaufmann et al, 
2011). The index is composed of a 0-100 scale, where a value of ‘100’ indicates the lowest level of 
perceived corruption, and a value of ‘0’ indicates the lowest level of perceived corruption 
(Transparancy International, 2015, p.2).  
 
There exist however, serious limitations using perception based data in corruption research. Firstly, It 
is possible that there are systemic biases within the measure, because respondents can have different 
views of what ‘corruption’ entails (Kaufmann et al, 2011, p. 241). This is especially the case when 
comparing different country scores to each other, wherein cultural aspects may determine what is 
considered a corrupt act, and what is not – forming a threat to the reliability of the results. Serious 
questions have also been raised whether or not the CPI-index and the use of the concept of corruption 
may just capture prevailing stereotypes about the public sector or unrelated general mismatches in 
the political and economic system (Philp, 2014, p. 19). Likewise, the question remains whether the 
degree to which people see their public sector as corrupt may be based on the amount of media 
coverage of the subject (Treisman, 2014, p.96). However, Svensson (2005) argues that the concept of 
corruption shares an underlying institutional framework which makes it likely that different forms of 
corruption are correlated (Svensson, 2005, p. 21).  
 
Secondly, the CPI-scores are a representation of perceptions of incidences of corruption. (Andersson & 
Heywood, 2009, p. 752). Andersson & Heywood argue that a research conducted by William Miller et 
al. (2001) finds inconsistency between the perceptions and actual personal experience of corruption, 
since the perception of corruption in both the Czech Republic and Ukraine was high, although citizens 
in the Czech Republic are much less likely to have been directly involved (Andersson & Heywood, 
2009, p. 752).  Yet, even when objective or fact-based data regarding political corruption on all 
European member states were to exists, it would be hardly possible to interpret that data For 
example, a lot of criminal trials regarding (political) corruption can indicate an efficient police force, as 
much as it can be attributed to the degree of political corruption in the system (Heywood, 1997).  
Furthermore, as Heywood (1997) argues, laws about political corruption also are not necessarily 
consistent in interpretation across different countries; voluntary private contributions to political 
parties may be welcomed in one country, and prompt criminal investigations in another (Heywood, 
1997, p. 423). Consequently, although criticism on the CPI-index should be considered, causal 
relationships based on the Corruption Perception Index can be reliably established (Andersson & 
Heywood, 2009, p. 755).  
 
Difference in levels of analysis. 
Another point of interest is that within this research the levels of political corruption are measured on 
the national level, while amendment behavior is a phenomenon on the individual level of (a national 
delegation of) MEP’s. What then, is the relationship between the two?  
 
Peters & Welch (1978) researched the relationship between state political cultures and (individual) 
legislative attitudes towards corruption in the United States. Their findings indicate that variations in 
the toleration and support for corrupt acts can be explained by differences in political culture specific 
to each state. The fact that Peters & Welch attributed this difference solely to political culture has 
become subject of academic critique. It is, however, valuable to acknowledge the existence of state-
specific variation of toleration and support for corrupt acts, for these variations arguably exist in the 
European states as well. To explain the relationship between the degree of corruption of a national 
political system and the behavior of a national delegation of MEP’s, aforementioned variation in 
toleration of corrupt practice may influence national delegations of MEP’s via ‘adult political 
socialization’ (Sullivan et al, 2009, p. 69). Seeking to explain the difference in political tolerance 
between citizens and politicians, Sullivan et al. (2009), conclude that even after controlling for various 
social, demographic, political and psychological characteristics, there still is something that 
distinguishes the attitudes of national legislators from ‘ordinary people’. This mechanism of ‘adult 
political socialization’ is a mechanism wherein the participation of legislators within the political elite 
party shape their individual attitudes (Sullivan et al, 2009, p. 69). Similarly, Checkel (2005) argues that 
organizations and group environments provide certain ‘shortcuts, cues and buffers’ that can lead an 
individual to certain roles, because they are appropriate in that particular setting (Checkel, 2005, p. 
810). It is therefore possible that the interaction of national delegations of MEP’s and their specific 
political elite influences the attitudes of MEP’s on corruption, either through a more general process 
of adult political socialization or a shift from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness  
(Checkel, 2005, p. 810). 
 
Quite possibly however, processes of socialization occur within the European Institutions as well, 
which in turn can affect attitudes regarding the tolerance of corrupt practice. Because the literature 
on European socialization is still growing, ‘research is often of an inductive nature whereby some trial-
and-error predominates’ so that conclusive answers to this question are not yet present. (Beyers, 
2010, p. 917). While European socialization possibly poses a danger to the assumption that elite 
socialization affects attitudes on corruption, detailed debate about the key aspects of socialization 
within the European Parliament is beyond the scope of this work.  
 
The notion that elite socialization affects the attitudes of MEP’s on corruption is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, because this is additional argument for why patterns of political corruption might be 
found in the amendment behavior of MEPs. Secondly, it is important because it makes a connection 
between the dynamics of a national political system and the individual amendment-behavior of 
(delegations of national) MEP’s.  
 
Control variables. 
Within this research, a particular point of interest is the usage of control variables. It is possible, when 
aiming to measure political corruption, a spurious relationship is measured. Most likely, the extent or 
quality of democratic practice in a country may pose a danger to the results, since Montinola and 
Jackman (2002) found that in countries where democratization is more complete, which is reflected in 
the nature of elections and the effective power of elected legislators, much lower levels of corruption 
are found (Montinola and Jackman, 2002, p. 167). The control variables should therefore be variables 
measuring democratic development per country. For this, parts of the Democracy Index 2015 
produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit are used. This index consists of five different measures 
which together compose an ‘overall score’ per country. Within the analysis, only four of these will be 
used, omitting the measure ‘functioning of government’. This is done because the ‘functioning of 
government’ measure contains questions about corruption, which could potentially harm the analysis 
by comparing corruption perception scores with a measure which also contains a questions about 
corruption perception. The control variables ‘Electoral process and pluralism’, Political participation’, 
‘Democratic political culture’ and ‘Civil liberties’ will therefore be used. 
 
As an additional note, the differences in political culture in this research must be addressed. Although 
theoretical assumptions about the links between national political cultures and corruption are made in 
the theoretical part of this research, the measure ‘democratic political culture’ by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit will not pose any analytical problems. This is because the first is an theoretical notion 
regarding elite attitudes and corrupt practices, and the latter is about societal attitudes regarding 
democracy.  
 Method of data analysis:  
A regression model will be made, wherein the relationship between the independent variable ‘CPI-
scores’ and the dependent variable ‘amount of amendments per nationality’ is examined, with the 
addition of the four independent measures of democracy.  
 
Results: 
The presence of outliers within the data can considerably distort the results by strengthening or 
weakening any effects (Argyrous, 2011, p. 277). When plotting the CPI-scores and amendments per 
nationality in a scatterplot as shown in figure 1, visual inspection shows that Italy might be an outlier. 
After calculating the mean (113.61) and the standard deviation (38.29) the data shows that Italy 
(191.00) is an outlier since its value is more than the mean plus two standard deviation (Field, 2009, 
p.153) and is thus omitted.  
    
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   Figure 1: Scatterplot of data points with country labels. 
 
With the outliers removed, the condition of homoscedacity must also be met (Argyrous, 2011, p. 275). 
It is possible to determine whether or not the data points are constant over the length of the 
regression line, and check for the presence of heteroscedacity by creating scatter plots and visually 
inspect them (Argyrous, 2011, p. 275). Figure 2 shows that the control variables ‘Electoral Process and 
pluralism’ visually violates the assumption of homoscedacity of the data.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 2: Distribution of data points of dependent variables. 
In an attempt to reduce the data of systemic bias, the data is also tested for normality. Using the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, the significance values of both the control variables ‘Electoral process 
and pluralism’ (.000) and ‘Civil liberties’ (.001) are shown to be smaller than the value of 0,05, 
indicating that these variables are not normally distributed (Field, 2009, p.144). Considering the 
possible disturbance of any results, these control variables will not be used.  
 
Table 1: Linear regression model of the amount of amendments per nationality. 
 
The regression analysis in table 1 shows that the b-value of all predictors is positive, indicating a 
positive relationship in all three variables (Field, 2009, p. 238). The adjusted R-square indicates the 
‘goodness of fit’ of the model, which in total accounts for about 27% of the variation in the amount of 
amendments per nationality (Field, 2009, p. 235). 
 
Considering all dependent variables are significant factors and the aforementioned theoretical notions 
on the links between degree of democratization, the data must be checked for multicollinearity. An 
analysis of the correlation-matrix does not show values indicating a substantial correlation (r > .8) 
between predictor variables, although they are close to this ‘rule of thumb’ (Argyrous, 2011, p. 272). 
However, results show that the average value for VIF (2.36) is well above 1, potentially indicating a 
bias in data (Field, 2009, p. 242). When high levels of multicollinearity are found, this makes it difficult 
to assess the importance of the different predictors (Field, 2009, p. 224).   
 
Given the fact that all dependent variables are significant predictors of the independent variable 
‘amendments per nationality’, and it is likely that the dependent variables are interrelated since the 
results show high levels of multicollinearity, it is difficult to assess the effect of perceived levels of 
political corruption on the amount of amendments per nationality. However, the b-value is positive. 
While it is not possible to assess the precise effect of this predictor, this result does show that an 
increase in CPI-scores (and thus lower levels of perceived corruption), has a positive effect on the 
amount of amendments per corresponding nationality. 
 
Conclusion. 
Generally, political corruption reduces the effective domain of public action, and thus the reach of 
democracy, by transforming public agencies of collective action to instruments of private benefit 
(Warren, 2004, p. 328). This thesis sought to identify whether the power to submit amendments is 
subject to this form of ‘capture’, by analysing the relationship between national levels of perceived 
corruption and the relative amount of amendments per nationality. The European Parliament 
presented a case wherein it was theorized that patterns of political corruption would be present.   
 
From theory it was expected that countries with a low CPI-score - and thus higher levels of perceived 
corruption - would have a positive effect on the amount of amendments that MEP’s with a 
corresponding nationality submit. However, while it is not possible to assess the effects in detail due 
to multicollinearity, the findings indicate that an increase in the value of CPI-scores (and thus lower 
levels of perceived corruption) has a positive effect on the relative amount of amendments that MEP’s 
with corresponding nationality submit. Multicollinearity shows that the levels of perceived corruption 
and levels of democratization are interrelated. Theoretically, democratization can have an effect on 
the levels of perceived corruption and the findings suggest that the CPI-scores are a function of the 
level of democratization in a country. More specifically, the existence of a democratic political culture 
is significant on the p < .001 level. While an inquiry about the effects of democratic political culture on 
amendment behavior is beyond the scope of this paper, the relationship between a democratic 
political culture and the relative amount of amendments is interesting for further research on political 
culture and legislative behavior. 
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